Abstract. In systems design, we generally distinguish the architecture and the protocol levels. In the context of privacy by design, in the first case, we talk about privacy architectures, which define the privacy goals and the main features of the system at high level. In the latter case, we consider the underlying concrete protocols and privacy enhancing technologies that implement the architectures. In this paper, we address the question that whether a given protocol conforms to a privacy architecture and provide the answer based on formal methods. We propose a process algebra variant to define protocols and reason about privacy properties, as well as a mapping procedure from protocols to architectures that are defined in a high-level architecture language.
Introduction
According to the definition provided in [6] , "the architecture of a system is the set of [elements and their relations] needed to reason about the system". In the context of privacy, the elements are typically the privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) themselves and the purpose of the architecture is to combine them to achieve the privacy requirements. Generally speaking, an architecture can be seen as the abstraction of a system since an architecture abstracts away the details provided by PETs (such as message ordering, timing, complex cryptographic algorithms, etc.). Architectures only capture the main functionalities that a system should provide, for instance, which computations and communications are to be performed by the components.
Works in privacy by design mainly focus on PETs rather than architectures. In the position paper [3] , the authors addressed the problem of privacy by design at the architecture level and proposed the application of formal methods that facilitate a systematic architecture design. In particular, they provided the idea of the architecture language and logic, a dedicated variant of epistemic logics [12] , to deal with different aspects of privacy. Basically, an architecture is defined as a set of architecture relations, which capture the computations and communications abilities of each component. For instance, a relation compute i (x = t) specifies that a component i can compute a value t for x. Nevertheless, since [3] is a position paper, the language envisioned in the paper is mainly based on an introductory description. An extended version of this language is detailed in [2] .
In this paper, we address the major question that whether the integration or combination of several different PETs conforms to a particular architecture. One challenge we have to face is that due to the diversity of technologies and protocols, their combination can raise a huge number of scenarios. Moreover, architectures are defined in an abstract way, while concrete implementations are more detailed, and it is challenging to define a proper abstraction from a lower to a higher level. The goal of this paper is to provide answers to this question.
Specifically, our main contributions are two-fold: first, we propose a modified variant of the applied π-calculus [13] for specifying the protocols related to PETs, and reasoning about the knowledge of components during the protocol run. Second, we propose a mapping procedure which defines the connection between the protocol specified in the calculus and the architecture defined in the architecture language. This mapping allows us to show whether a protocol (or a combination of protocols) conforms to a given architecture. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first attempt that examines the connection between the two levels based on formal methods in the context of privacy protection.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review the privacy architectures language (PAL) proposed in [2] , which is a high-level language for specifying architectures and reasoning about privacy requirements in them. Sections 3 and 4 contain our contributions. The modified applied π-calculus is given in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the connection between each calculus process and relation in PAL, as well as the definitions and properties of the conformance between the two levels. In Section 5 we review the most relevant related works. Finally, we conclude the paper and discuss about the future works in Section 6.
Architecture Level
The language we review here is a simplified version of the one in [2] . The functionality of a service is defined by Ω = X = T , where T is a term andX ∈ Var represents a variable that can be either indexed (X K ) or unindexed (X). Each X can be a single variable or an array of variables. F ∈ F un denotes a function, and F (X) defines the iterative application of F to the variables in the array X (e.g.: + (X) defines the summation of the variables in a given array).
An architecture A is defined by a set of components C i , i ∈ [1, . . . , n], associated with the set of relations {R}. Each relation R specifies a capability of the components. Subscripts i and j denote component IDs. Has arch i (X) expresses the fact thatX is a variable that component C i initially has (i.e., an input variable of C i ). Receive i,j ({Att},X) expresses the possibility for C i to receive the variableX directly from C j , and optionally an attestation Att related to this variable. An attestation, defined by Attest i ({X = T }), captures a statement made by C i on the set of equations. EachX = T in the set {X=T } expresses the integrity ofX, stating that it equals to T . Compute i (X = T ) says that C i can compute a variable defined by an equationX = T . Check i (T 1 = T 2 ) states that C i can check the satisfaction of property T 1 = T 2 . The propertyX = T in Attest i is related to the same property in Compute i , namely when C i computes X = T it can send an attestation on this. Verif Attest j (Att) says that C j is able to successfully verify the origin of an attestation. Finally, Trust i,j is used to express the fact that component C i trusts C j , and this trust relation does not change during operations. Trust relations are pre-defined, and an attestation sent by C i will be accepted by C j after a successful verification only if C j trusts C i .
The semantics of an architecture is defined as its sets of compatible traces. A trace is a sequence of possible high-level events occurring in the system. Events can be seen as instantiated relations of the architecture.
To distinguish events from relations, we let events start with lowercase. For instance, event has i X : V captures the fact that C i has the value V forX, and compute i X = T expresses the fact that C i performes the computatioñ X = T . The other events are interpreted based on their corresponding relations (see [2] for details). An event trace θ is compatible with an architecture A, if in this trace, only events which are instantiations of components of the architecture can appear in θ -except for the compute events. For the case of compute events, besides the computation specified explicitly in the architecture, we also take into account the "background" computations (deduction) that can be performed by each component, based on the data it has. This deduction ability of each C i is captured by its deduction system i [2] . The semantics of events is based on the component states and the global state of the architecture, given as follows: A , contains only the trust properties specified by the architecture. The semantics of an event trace is defined by the function S T , which specifies the impact of a trace of events on the states of the components, through the impact of each event on the states (defined by the function S E ).
Due to lack of space we only present S E for the compute event here, the full list can be found in [2] . The notation .θ is used to denote a trace whose first element is and the rest of the trace is θ, while denotes the empty trace. 
is the set of compatible traces of A. To reason about the privacy requirements of architectures, the architecture logic is proposed in [2] , which is based on the architecture language PAL.
This logic involves modality K i that represents the epistemic knowledge [12] of C i about T 1 = T 2 . In the rest of the paper, we refer to φ as an architecture property. The semantics S(φ) of a property φ is defined as follows:
where Eq (Eq ) represents an equation (X) holds if and only if no execution trace can lead to a state in which C i gets any value of any X k . We note that Has i properties only inform on the fact that C i can get or derive some values for the variables but they do not bring any guarantee about the correctness of these values. Integrity requirements can be expressed using the property K i (T 1 = T 2 ), which states that the component C i knows the truth of the integrity property T 1 = T 2 . In σ ≥ σ , compared to σ , σ represents the state at the end of a longer trace. Finally, σ pk i i Eq and Eq ⇒ Eq capture that Eq can be deduced from σ pk i and Eq , respectively. Example Architecture: Let us consider a very simple smart metering architecture which consists in the communication between two components: the meter (M ) and the operator (O). The goal of this architecture is to ensure that the operator will get the consumption fee for a given period and to be convinced that the fee is correct. The privacy requirement says that O must not obtain the consumption data. One possible design solution is that the meter passes directly the consumption data to the operator who will compute the fee:
In the architecture A 1 , the meter initially has the (input) variable X c that represents the array of r consumption data X ci , i ∈ [1, . . . , r]. The meter is capable to compute each metered data (X mi ) based on each consumption data (X ci ). Intuitively, in X mi = X ci , X mi will get the value of X ci . Then, the operator will receive the metered data (X mi ), along with the attestation made by M on the integrity property X mi = X ci . After verifying the received attestation with success, due to Trust O,M the operator knows that X mi = X ci . Then for each X mi , O computes the tariff based on the function F . Finally, O computes the summation of the r tariffs (i.e., array X tf ) to get the fee for the period. 
Protocol Level
To reason about the concrete implementations of an architecture, we propose a modified variant of the applied π-calculus. We decided to modify the basic applied π-calculus [13] because thanks to its expressive syntax and semantics, it is broadly used for security verification of systems and protocols (e.g., [14] , [10] , [11] , [18] , [9] , [4] , [17] ). Our main goal is to modify some syntax and semantics elements of the applied π-calculus, making it more convenient to find the connection between the calculus semantics and the interpretation of architecture relations. One of such modifications is the notion of component, which is characterized by three elements: (i) the internal behavior of the component; (ii) the unique ID assigned to the component; and (iii) the set of IDs of the components who are trusted by this component. Another reason why we cannot use the basic applied π-calculus is that it focuses on reasoning about the information a DolevYao attacker (who can eavesdrop on all communications) obtains. However, in our case we reason about the information that components can have, which are only aware of the communications they can take part in.
Syntax of the Modified Applied π-Calculus
We assume an infinite set of names N and variables V, and a finite set of component identifiers L, where V ∩ N ∩ L = ∅. Terms are defined as follows:
The meaning of each term is given as follows: c models a communication channel. l i represents a component ID (l i = l j if i = j) that uniquely identifies a component. n, m and k denote names, which model some kind of data (e.g., a random nonce, a secret key, etc.). Terms x, y, z denote variables that represent any term, namely, any term can be bounded to variables. f (t 1 , . . . , t p ) is a function, which models cryptographic primitives, e.g., digital signature can be modeled by sign(x m , x sk ) , where x m and x sk specify the message and the private key, respectively. Moreover, f can also be used to specify verification functions (e.g., the signature check is modeled by function checksign (sign(x m , x sk ), x pk ) , where x pk represents the public key corresponding to the private key x sk ).
We rely on the same type system for terms as in the applied π-calculus [13] . Due to lack of space, we omit the unimportant details of this type system, and leave it implicit in the rest of the paper. We assume that terms are well-typed and that substitutions preserve types (see [22] for details).
The internal operation of components is modeled by processes. Processes are specified with the following syntax:
Note that for simplicity we left out the infinite replication of processes, !P . As a result a protocol/system run consists of a finite number of traces.
Process c t .P sends the term t (where t = (t m , t sig )) on channel c, and continues with the execution of P . Process c t m , t sig .P models the attestation sending, where t m and the signature t sig are sent on c.
Process c(x).Q waits for a term on channel c and then binds the received term to x in Q. Process c(x m , x sig ).Q waits for a term x m and its signature x sig on channel c, which models the attestation reception.
P |Q behaves as processes P and Q running (independently) in parallel. A restriction νn.P is a process that creates a new, bound name n, and then behaves as P . The name n is called bound because it is available only to P . Process let x = t in P proceeds to P and binds every (free occurrence of) x in P to t.
Process if (t 1 = t 2 ) then P says that if t 1 = t 2 (with respect to the equational theory E, discussed later) then process P is executed, else it stops. Its special case is if x m = checksign(x sig , x pk li ) then P , which captures the verification of an attestation (i.e., signature x sig with key x pk li ). For message authentication and integrity protection purposes digital signature and message authentication code (MAC) are used. In this paper we only consider signature.
Finally, the nil process 0 does nothing and specifies process termination. Components: To make the connection between calculus processes and architecture relations more straightforward, we introduce the notion of components. P ρ l defines a component with the unique identifier l, who trusts the components whose IDs are in the set ρ, and whose behavior is defined by process P . The trust relation can be either one-way or symmetric, for instance, P {l2} l1 and Q {l1} l2 represent components l 1 and l 2 who trust each other. The rationale behind this way of component specification is that the component IDs and the trust relation between them are pre-defined, and do not change during the protocol run (this is what we assumed at the architecture level). In addition, we assume that a trusted component will not become untrusted.
Systems: A system, denoted by S, can be an empty system with no component: 0 S ; a singleton system with one component: P ∅ l ; the parallel composition of components: P ρ1 l1 | Q ρ2 l2 , where ρ 1 and ρ 2 may include l 2 and l 1 , respectively; or a system with name restriction. To capture more complex systems, we also allow systems to be the parallel composition of sub-systems, S 1 | S 2 .
The name restriction νn.S represents the creation of new name n, such as secret keys, or a random nonce which are only available to the components in S.
Semantics of the Modified Applied π-Calculus
In order to check the conformance between protocols and architectures, it suffices to consider the internal reduction rules of the calculus, which model the behavior of the protocol (without contact with its environment). Reduction rules capture the internal operations (e.g., let or if processes) and communications performed by components. We define and distinguish the following reduction rules:
, where {tm/xm, tsig/xsig}. Note: lj accepts the attestation if li ∈ ρj.
, where ωc ∈ {comp(lj, x : t), has(lj, x : k), check(lj, t1 : t2), error, veratt(lj, xm:tm)}; Before defining the system states, we label each reduction relation (arrow) based on the name of the rule and the terms used in them. We adopt the notion of equational theory E from [13] , [22] , which contains rules of form t 1 = t 2 ∈ E, that define when two terms are equal. For instance, the equational theory E may include rules for signature verification, decryption, MAC verification, etc. The meaning of each reduction rule is as follows:
-Rule (Rcv) captures the communication between components l i and l j . Namely, l i sends value t for x on channel c, which is received by l j . As a result, we get Q{t/x} that binds t to every free occurrence of x in Q. It is assumed that t = (t m , t sig ), which is treated as a special case. -Rule (Rcv att ) deals with exchanging the message t m and the signature t sig on channel c, which models the reception of the attestation Attest li ({x m = t m }). As a result, we get Q in which t m and the signature are bound to x m and x sig , respectively. The reason that we distiguish (Rcv att ) from (Rcv) is because we want to make a clear distinction between the cases of receiving a message with and without an attestation. -Rule (Verif att ) captures the case when after binding t m and t sig to x m and the signature x sig , respectively, component l j successfully verified the signature using the corresponding public key of l i , t pk li . We implicitly assume that t m and t sig contain enough information for the receiver to identify the "type" of the received message (e.g., the consumption fee in smart metering systems). Rules (Rcv att ) and (Verif att ) together specify the scenario when l i sends to l j the value t m for x m , with the signature that proves the integrity and the authenticity of this message. Then, in case l j trusts l i , it knows the truth about the integrity property x m = t m . -Rule (Check) considers the case when two terms are equal in the check (with respect to the equational theory E), which leads to P as result. We assume that t 2 is not the checksign function, which is used for the attest verification. -Rule (Comp) models the computation x = t performed by l j . As a result, every free occurrence of x in P is given the value t. In this rule we assume that t can be either a variable or a function (except for sign and checksign, because they are considered as parts of the attestation), but not a name. -Rule (Has) deals with the case when t is a name. The name k, either bound (with νk) or free (without νk), represents the value of x. Here x is used to model the variable that l j initially has to capture the input data coming from the environment (e.g., the consumption data in the smart metering). -Rule (Error) specifies the case when two terms are not equal with respect to E. As a result, the process will continue with the nil process. States of components and systems: Let us consider a system S with n components. Let Label S be the set of all labels (ω s ∈ Label S ) of the reduction relations defined above, and let LTrace S be the set of all possible label traces of S. We define the functions V ST , V T and V L that update the states of the components and the entire system. V T and V L are similar to S T and S E in PAL, but they are based on label traces and labels instead of traces of events and events. V ST takes as input the set of all the possible label traces of S and handle each trace with V T . Let State n S denote the set of global state of S and ∅ tr an empty set of traces. Finally, in ω s .tr the label ω s is the prefix of the trace tr.
We let λ li and λ denote the state of component l i and the global state that consists in the state of all components in the system, respectively. Each λ li is defined by the pair (λ 
From Protocols to Architectures
In the sequel, we discuss how the corresponding architecture can be extracted based on a given protocol or system. Namely, given a protocol specified in our process calculus we define an extraction procedure that extracts the corresponding architecture relations. The extraction procedure is based on the application of a set of extraction rules that we define below. Each extraction rule specifies the connection between the traces of labels of a system and the corresponding architecture relation. We assume a (initial) system S which consists in the parallel composition of r components (for a finite r), namely, S
The corresponding architecture relations will be extracted based on the possible traces (i.e., the trace semantics) of S. We emphasize that during the extraction of architectural properties we only consider the reduction traces to capture the communication between components, without considering the activity of the environment (i.e., the Dolev-Yao attacker). Formally, we do not take into account the labelled transitions known in the applied π-calculus [13] . The reason is that the architecture relations focus only on the abilities of the components and the communication between them.
An architecture does not not contain the Compute relations for background computations. The situation is similar at the protocol level, where the protocol description specifies the basic computations and communications of the components, without involving the background computations. Hence, when extracting the architecture relations, it is sufficient to consider only the protocol description and its corresponding reduction traces. The background computations will be taken into account when we discuss the mapping to the Has j architecture logic property for reasoning about the data that can be deduced by a component.
Given a system S and the set LTrace S of (all) its possible label traces, we define the extraction function X T that extracts the corresponding architecture based on LTrace S . X ST is interpreted similarly as V ST . Rel S denotes the set of architectural relations of S. Function X L extracts a relation based on a label ω s and put it into α S . We use α S to denote the set of the extracted relations so far. We have the following extraction rules:
XST (∅tr, αS) = αS; XT (ωs.tr, αS) = XT (tr, XL(ωs, αS));
XT ( , αS) = αS; R has : XL(has(lj, 
Related Works
Dedicated languages have been proposed to specify privacy properties (e.g., [5] , [7] , [16] ) but they are complex and not intended to be used at the architectural level. In [2, 3] the authors addressed the idea of applying formal methods to architecture design and proposed a simple privacy architecture language (PAL).
On the other hand, there are also many works focusing mainly on the protocol level, providing formal methods for specifying and verifying protocols, as well as reasoning about the security and privacy properties (e.g., [19] , [21] , [8] ). For this purpose, process algebra languages are the most favoured means in the literature, because they are general frameworks to model concurrent systems.
In addition, among the process algebras, the applied π-calculus ( [22] , [13] ) is one of the most promising language in the sense that its syntax and semantics are more expressive than the others (e.g., [20] , [1] , [15] ). It also have been used to analyse security and privacy protocols (e.g., in [14] , [10] , [11] , [18] , [9] , [4] , [17] ). However, we cannot use it directly for our purpose because for instance, it lacks syntax and semantics for modelling component IDs and trust relations. Some modifications and extensions of the applied π-calculus are required, which we proposed in Section 3.
Finally, the definition of the architecture comes before the definition of the protocol in software development cycles. Therefore, we chose to make it possible to verify the conformance of a protocol described in our language to an architecture. We used the architecture language in [2] for this purpose. Its main advantage is that (i) compared to informal pictorial methods, or semi-formal representations such as UML diagrams, it is more formal and precise, while (ii) compared to process calculi, it is more abstracted. The architecture language PAL enables designers to reason at the level of architectures, providing ways to express properties without entering into the details of specific protocols.
Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper, we proposed the application of formal methods to privacy by design. We provided the mapping from the protocol level to the architecture level for checking if a given implementation conforms to an architecture and showed its correctness. For this purpose, we modified the applied π-calculus and defined the connection between the semantics of the calculus and PAL. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt at examining the connection between the protocol and the architecture levels in the privacy protection context.
The calculus version and the mapping procedure we proposed in this paper are based on a simplified version of the architecture language. Indeed, we only consider the attestation on equationX = T . Moreover, our proposed calculus (and mapping) does not support the modelling of zero-knowledge proofs, as well as the posibility of spot-checks used in toll pricing systems. Hence, our method can only handle simple architectures and protocols at this stage. One future direction of our work is to extend the calculus to support these such extensions.
